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Theory in the Foster Care Context
Michele Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
Hundreds of thousands of children fill this country's foster care
system.' Statistics indicate that the incidence of child abuse in the United
States has more than doubled since 1986.2 The purpose of the foster care
system, of course, is to provide a temporary safe haven for children who
have been subjected to abuse or neglect by their primary caretakers. 3
Unfortunately, in many cases the foster care arrangement does not provide
this Yearly, numerous child advocacy organizations and child guardians
bring cases in federal court alleging that the state has failed children in
foster care. Those bringing cases on behalf of children allege either
violations of various federal statutes or violations of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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1. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform: Revolutionalizing the
Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 8 (1995) (noting that the best
estimate of the number of children in legal custody of the state was approximately 400,000
and expected to skyrocket beyond 550,000 before the end of the year).
2. See Jean Peters-Baker, Note, Punishing the Passive Parent: Ending A Cycle of
Violence, 65 UMKC L. REv. 1003, 1003 (1997).
3. See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of
Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 199, 204 (1988).
Social service agencies are expected to implement family services which will facilitate
reunification of the biological family and, if this is not possible, work to terminate parental
rights, freeing the child for adoption. See Megan O'Laughlin, Note, A Theory of Relativity:
Kinship Foster Care May Be the Key To Stopping the Pendulum of Termination v.
Reunification, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1427, 1432 (1998).
4. See generally DAvID FANSHEL & EUGENE B. SHINN, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
(1978).
5. See SUSAN GLUCKMEZEY, CHILDREN IN COURT: PUBLIC POLICYMAKING AND FEDERAL
COURT DECISIONS 109-10 (1996) [hereinafter GLUCKMEZEY].
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Courts, legal scholars and the parties in these cases are confused as to
whether a private right of action is available for children alleging
substantive due process violations by state actors in the foster care context.6
The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services seemed to provide clarification.7 The Court
held that children in legal custody of the state, but in physical custody of a
natural parent, do not have a private right of action to sue the state for
substantive due process violations.8
However, some courts have recently carved out an exception to
DeShaney, providing a private right of action by adopting a state-created
danger theory.9 Under such theory, the state might be liable for its failure
to adequately assess and prevent incidents of severe child abuse. Most
jurisdictions that permit the state-created danger theory exception do so
when a foster child is returned to a natural parent despite clear signs that
future abuse is likely to occur. 10 The exception may be used when it is
clear that the child was taken from a foster care placement and put into a
more vulnerable situation with the natural parent. In cases where the
exception was successfully used, the child ultimately suffered severe abuse
by the natural parent after being returned.11
This Note focuses on the application of a state-created danger theory
and explores the benefits and problems of permitting a cause of action
under such a theory. It is important that these children have an avenue of
redress; the physical and psychological injuries that they suffer will surely
affect them throughout their lives and may require future medical and
psychological treatment as well as special education services. However,
courts must recognize a delicate balance, which permits these actions while
continuing to reunite families when it is possible to do so without further
harm to the children.
I first provide a brief general introduction to the state-created danger
theory. I follow with an overview of the foster care system in order to
provide a context for analysis of substantive due process violations
specifically in the foster care cases. Next, I analyze the United States
Supreme Court's landmark DeShaney decision, focusing on its application
by the lower courts. I then examine the recent adoption, by some
jurisdictions, of the state-created danger theory in the foster care context.
Finally, I discuss problems that may accompany the adoption of the
state-created danger theory in the foster care context. As one example, too
6. See Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 435,435 (1994).
7. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
8. See id. at 195-97.
9. See Currier v. Doran, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1280 (D. N.M. 1998); Tazioly v. City of
Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.97-CV-1219, 1998 WI. 633747, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998).
10. See Currier, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1280; Tazioly, 1998 WL 633747, at *9.
11. See Currier, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1280; Tazioly, 1998 WL 633747, at *10.
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much litigation aimed at child protective service workers who return
children to their natural parents may ultimately hinder the already slow
process of reuniting families. I present strategies to prevent this hindrance
while still preserving the private right of action under a state-created danger
theory.
II. THE STATE-CREATED DANGER THEORY GENERALLY
The state-created danger theory is often analogized to state actors
placing private citizens into a "snake pit.' 12 In a Seventh Circuit case
alleging due process violations based on a state-created danger theory, the
court noted,
[i]f the state puts a man in a position of danger from private
persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that
its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it
had thrown him into a snake pit.
13
The foster care cases presented in this Note illustrate that, in some
cases, state actors have indeed placed foster children into a "snake pit"
situation.
The Third Circuit suggested a test for analyzing the state-created
danger theory.' 4 According to this test, there are four common elements
present in cases which adopt the state created-danger theory. They are:
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;
(2) the state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the
plaintiff;
(3) there existed some relationship between the state and the plaintiff;
(4) the state actors used their authority to create an opportunity that
otherwise would not have existed for the third party's crime to
occur.
15
The court that announced this test ultimately did not permit a private
right of action because the factors were not met. However, the four factors
provide guidance for analyzing cases alleging violations under a state-
created danger theory.
The Third Circuit also noted that the state-created danger theory should
be limited to fact situations in which the state's action poses a foreseeable
risk to a discrete party as opposed to the public at large. 16 This limitation
12. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
13. Id.
14. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995).
15. Id.
16. See id. at 1152-53.
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may become problematic because many suits brought on behalf of foster
children alleging substantive due process violations by state actors are class
action lawsuits.
The Third Circuit applied the state-created danger theory in Kneipp v.
Tedder,17 decided in 1996. Though not a foster care situation, the facts of
Kneipp illustrate one instance when the private right of action was
permitted under the state-created danger theory. The plaintiffs alleged that
their daughter Samantha's severe and permanent injuries resulted from
substantive due process violations by police officers who placed her in a
dangerous and more vulnerable situation.1
8
Samantha and her husband Joe were walking home from a bar on a
very cold night when they were stopped and questioned by the police.'9
The police gave Joe permission to leave the scene to relieve the couple's
babysitter at home.20 Joe testified that when he left, Samantha was visibly
inebriated and leaning against the police car.21  He was under the
impression that the police, knowing of Samantha's state, would not leave
her alone upon completion of their questioning."
Though she was visibly intoxicated, had difficulty walking and smelled
of alcohol and urine, the police left Samantha alone after questioning her.23
Samantha sustained serious brain damage as a result of falling into an
embankment and being exposed to the severe weather for two hours before
anyone found her.24 Applying the state-created danger theory, the Kneipp
court determined that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether
Samantha's injuries resulted from the officers allowing her to remain in a
more vulnerable position than when they first encountered her.25 Thus, a
private right of action was permitted alleging substantive due process
violations by the police officers who left Samantha alone out in the cold.26
III. RECENT APPLICATION OF THE STATE-CREATED
DANGER THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FOSTER CARE
SYSTEM
A. OvERvIEW OF THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
A report of child abuse or neglect typically leads to intervention by a
17. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996).
18. See id. at 1203.
19. See id. at 1201.
20. See id. at 1202.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1201-02.
24. See id. at 1203.
25. Id. at 1208.
26. See id. at 1201.
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social service agency.27 An agency worker initiates an investigation, which
usually includes a visit to the child's home where the alleged abuse took
place and a telephone conversation with the individual who made the
report.28 At this point, the agency worker, and perhaps a supervisor,
decides whether to file a petition in court, initiating judicial inquiry.29 The
judicial proceeding is generally divided into two phases, which are
commonly referred to as "fact-finding" and "dispositional. 30
The purpose of the fact-finding phase is to present evidence to the court
and question witnesses to determine whether the alleged abuse actually
occurred.31 Assuming that a finding of abuse is made during the fact-
finding stage, the court maintains jurisdiction over the child and must
decide what action to take.32 This is done during the dispositional phase.33
The action taken during the dispositional phase will depend on an
assessment of how severe the abuse or neglect was and what course of
action will be best for the child. In order to ensure that further abuse does
not occur, the court may order placement for the child outside of the home,
psychological counseling for the family, supervised visitation or any
number of preventive service arrangements for the family.34
When the child is permitted to reside with the biological parent, the
state may still have "legal custody" while the parent maintains "physical
custody.' 35  This allows the state to monitor the family and possibly
provide necessary services.56 When the level of abuse or neglect is not
severe, this plan allows the child to maintain attachment to his/her family.
Children's attachment to family members is important and should be
supported when possible.37 A child's removal from the home is "a drastic
step which may have serious negative effects on the child. ' 38 It is difficult
for a child to adjust when unnecessarily separated from the primary
caretaker.
39
Alternatively, when the abuse or neglect is more severe, the child is
27. See Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARv. EDuc.
REV. 599 (1973), reprinted in ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY
AND STATE 454 (1995).
28. See id. at 456.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 456-57.
31. See id. at 456.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 456-57.
34. See id. at 457.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See Anita Weinberg and Linda Katz, Law and Social Work in Partnership for
Permanency: The Adoption and Safe Families Act and the Role of Concurrent Planning, 18
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 2, 14 (1998).
38. Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children From the
Home for Poverty Alone, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 447,453 (1997).
39. See id.
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placed in an out-of-home foster care placement allowing the state to
maintain both legal and physical custody.40 The goal is usually to reunite
the child with his/her natural parent(s), provided that the parent(s)
cooperate with the foster care agency.41 Cooperating with the agency may
entail attending parenting skills classes, psychological counseling, a drug
treatment program or whatever is deemed to be necessary by social services
workers. 42
Though the foster care arrangement is meant to provide a situation that
protects children from abuse, administration of the system has been widely
criticized in recent years.43 Abuse occurs in some foster care placements
by foster parents and/or foster siblings. 4 Sometimes this abuse is far worse
than the child experienced at home.45 Moreover, caseworkers allegedly
remove children from their biological homes when it is not warranted.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
individuals with rights against the state and federal branches of the
government and protects against deprivations of life, liberty or property.4
6
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states that a person acting under color of state law may be
liable when he or she acts to deprive an individual of rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the United States Constitution.47 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides a private right of action against an individual who, under color of
state law, acts to deprive another of rights secured by the law or the
48Constitution.
Claims brought on behalf of foster children under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
have alleged that the state has deprived them of rights created by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act,
the Child Abuse Prevention Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act and
other federal statutes.49 These actions are filed either as class action
lawsuits, or on behalf of individual children, depending on the
circumstances.
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, a recent class action lawsuit brought in New
40. See O'Laughlin, supra note 3, at 1431-32.
41. See id. at 1432.
42. See id. at 1431, 1432 n.31.
43. See id. at 1428.
44. See Mushlin, supra note 3, at 204.
45. See, e.g., Andy Newman, Mother and Daughter Sentenced in Death of a Young
Foster Child, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1999, at B7.
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
48. See Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1036 (1st Cir. 1996).
49. This Note will focus only on substantive due process claims. Discussion of actions
brought under the other federal statutes are beyond the scope of this paper and are not
relevant to an analysis of the state-created danger theory.
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York District Court, alleged, among other things, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
violations.50 Marisol A. serves as a good example of the type of fact
situation which gives rise to lawsuits alleging failure of the state to
adequately protect children in foster care.5 ' The plaintiffs were all children
who suffered, and in some cases continued to be at risk of suffering, severe
abuse and neglect.52 The factual allegations in the case "portray a child
welfare program in crisis and collectively suggest systemic deficiencies of
gross proportions. 53 Eleven children who endured a wide range of abuse
and neglect represented the class.54
Marisol's situation is a tragic example of the types of problems these
children faced and continue to face in the foster care system. Marisol was a
five-year old who was born two days after her mother was arrested for
selling drugs.55 Child protective service workers placed the child in a
foster home during and subsequent to the biological mother's
incarceration.56 However, Marisol was returned to her mother's custody
despite a criminal history and reports that she was abusing Marisol during
visitation. 57 Caseworkers failed to properly assess the appropriateness of
placing her with her mother and took no steps to monitor the home.58
Upon regaining custody, Marisol's mother confined her to a closet for
several months, deprived her of food resulting in her eating her own feces
and plastic garbage bags to survive and physically and sexually abused her
to the point of injury.59 During this period numerous reports were made to
child protective services to no avail.60  Ultimately, a housing inspector
noticed the situation by chance and made a report to the police
department.61 At the time Marisol A. v. Giuliani was filed in court, no
action had yet been taken to terminate the mother's parental rights;
moreover, no counseling or support services were implemented by social
services workers assigned to Marisol's case.
62
C. THE LANDMARK DESHANEY CASE
Under the United States Supreme Court's landmark DeShaney
decision, state liability for substantive due process violations in the foster
50. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (alleging, among other
things, substantive due process violations by state actors).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 669.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 669-70.
55. See id. at 670.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id.
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care context seems to turn on whether the child is in physical custody of the
state.
63
In DeShaney, Social Services workers temporarily placed a minor
child, Joshua, in the custody of a hospital after signs of physical abuse were
found on his body.64 A team of professionals released Joshua to his
father's care after finding insufficient evidence of abuse to prevent the
return of Joshua to his father.65 Within the next six months, social services
workers duly noted suspected abuse in Joshua's case file but took no action
to remove the child from his father's home.66 Ultimately, severe beatings
by the father rendered Joshua irreversibly and profoundly retarded.67 The
majority in DeShaney did not permit a private right of action, noting that
the due process clause is not meant to protect individuals from harm
imposed by private citizens.68 Since Joshua's father was a private citizen
and he inflicted the injuries, the Court imposed no duty upon state social
services workers to protect Joshua.69
DeShaney appeared to bar a private right of action for substantive due
process violations unless the child is outside of the parents' physical
custody.70 A special relationship triggering a heightened duty of care exists
only when abuse occurs while the child is physically in the state's
custody.71
It is worth noting that Justice Blackmun wrote a passionate dissent in
which he characterized the majority as retreating into a "sterile formalism
which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of the case before it or
the legal norms that should apply to those facts."72 He ended his dissent
with a paragraph for which DeShaney has become known:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated and irresponsible, bullying,
cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents
who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or
learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing except,
as the Court revealingly observes... 'dutifully recorded these
incidents in [their] files.' It is a sad commentary upon American
life, and constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor
and proud proclamations about 'liberty and justice for all'-that
this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the
63. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
64. Id. at 192.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 192-93.
67. See id. at 198.
68. Id. at 196.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 201.
71. See id. at 197.
72. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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remainder of his life profoundly retarded. Joshua- and his mother,
as petitioners here, deserve-but now are denied by this Court-
the opportunity to have the facts of their case considered in the
light of the constitutional protection that 42 U.S.C Section 1983 is
meant to provide. 3
Unfortunately, the majority did not agree with Justice Blackmun, adhering
instead to strict formalism.74
After the DeShaney decision, it appeared as though a private right of
action did not exist in the foster care context unless the child alleging
failure by social services workers was physically in state custody. Most
courts now apply a strict DeShaney analysis, denying all substantive due
process claims where the child is in physical custody of his parent even
when the state has retained legal custody."
The DeShaney Court cited several of its prior decisions, noting, "when
the State takes a person into its own custody and holds him their against his
will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general well being. 76 Courts regularly
permit cases brought on the behalf of foster children who are placed
outside of the home, when plaintiffs allege substantive due process
violations by state actors for not protecting them.77 They allow these cases
under the theory that by removing the child from the natural parent's home
and placing the child in a state-approved foster home, the state assumes at
least a limited responsibility for his or her safety.78
D. APPLICAnON OF THE STATE CREATED DANGER THEORY IN THE
FOSTER CARE CONTEXT
Some jurisdictions have recently recognized a narrow exception to
DeShaney. This exception-the state-created danger theory-applies when
a child, though in legal custody of the state, resides with a natural parent
and suffers injury due to abuse.79 This is because the Due Process Clause
is intended to protect a person's life and health from egregious misconduct
by government officials.80
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See Bank of Ill. v. Over, 65 F.3d 76, 77 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding no private right of
action under the Constitution when child in legal custody of the state was beaten by her
father because state social workers were under no duty to protect people from private
violence); Blalock v. Tellus, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Kan. 1998) (finding no private right of
action when state has legal custody but mother has physical custody because mother had
power to protect child from abuse).
76. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199.
77. See Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990).
78. See id.
79. See Currier, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1280; Tazioly, 1998 WL 633747, at *9-10.
80. See Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional
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Some lower courts conclude that the misconduct in many of the foster
care cases would fail to satisfy the strict DeShaney rule because the child is
not in physical custody of the state.81 However, the circumstances in some
of these fact situations are so egregious that a private right of action is
82permitted under the state-created danger theory. Here, the mere fact that
these children suffer injuries after being placed back into a home with their
biological parents does not summarily deny a private right of action.
The action (or inaction) of state officials in cases applying the state-
created danger theory in the foster care context is particularly egregious.
Typically, the child is placed in a relatively safe foster care setting and then
removed, and placed back with a natural parent who poses a known risk to
the child's safety.83
In Currier v. Doran, the plaintiff-child was removed from his mother's
home and placed with his father, who did not have original custody.84
While the child was living with his father, the natural mother became aware
of abuse by the father and made a report. Consequently, the state removed
the child from the father's care. 5 Three days later the child was again
86
returned to his father's physical custody. Soon thereafter, the child
sustained fatal bums when the father poured boiling water on him.87 The
88Currier court fixed liability on the state. The court distinguished
DeShaney on the grounds that, in Currier, the state officials created the
danger of mistreatment and rendered the child more vulnerable to attack by
placing him back in the physical custody of his natural father.89 Applying
DeShaney strictly would focus the analysis on the fact that the biological
father, and not the state, had physical custody, thereby not permitting the
private right of action against the state.
The state-created danger theory was also applied in Tazioly v. City of
Philadelphia.90 The plaintiffs acted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging,
among other things, substantive due process violations by the state.9 1
Michael, the child, suffered severe injuries inflicted by his biological
mother.92 Michael was born ten weeks premature and addicted to
cocaine.93 His mother tested positive for cocaine at the hospital where
Tort: DeShaney and lts Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REv. 107, 166 (1991).
81. See, e.g., Marisol A., 929 F. Supp. 662.
82. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D. N.M. 1998).
83. See id. at 1281.
84. Id. at 1279.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 1281.
89. Id.
90. Tazioly, 1998 WL 633747, at *2.
91. See id. at *1.
92. See id.
93. See id. at *3.
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Michael was born and appeared to be "hostile, abusive and paranoid" when
she visited Michael at the hospital.94 Social services filed a petition in
court attempting to gain jurisdiction over the child.95 Ultimately, the court
granted legal custody of Michael to the state, while physical custody was
granted to his maternal grandmother.
96
Notations were made in Michael's file that, during visits, his mother
was disruptive and verbally abusive to him.97 She held the child outside of
a second-story window on one occasion, threatening to drop him.98 Further
notations were made in the case file describing the mother's appearance at
a family court hearing as "bizarre and hostile."99
When Michael was almost two years old, the social services
department was under great pressure to discharge children from the foster
care system.100 Consequently, despite mounting evidence that the mother
posed great danger to Michael, the court entrusted him to his mother's
care. 101 The caseworker, obviously aware of the dangerous situation that
Michael was being placed in, made a notation in his case file reading:
no psychological [evaluation]
no risk assessment
no drug test
why return home? 02
Approximately six months later, social services received a report that
Michael was covered with bruises. Despite this, his mother maintained
physical custody. The stated reason was that the reported abuse could not
be substantiated.103  Within six months of this, when Michael was
approximately three years old, emergency room doctors treated him for a
"spiral" fracture of his femur, an indication that his leg had been
deliberately twisted."°4 Again, social services instructed the hospital to
return Michael to his mother, despite the fact that his injuries required him
to be placed in a cast from his waist to the bottom of his legs.'05
106Neighbors also made reports to Social Services to no avail. Finally,
approximately one month after his hospitalization, neighbors making a
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at *4.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at *4-5.
101. See id. at *5.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at *5.
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report of abuse were told by social services, "if you're really that
concerned, call the police."'10 7 They did just that.'08 The child was found in
a dark comer, naked, tied to a chair, covered with bruises and cigarette
bums.10
9
The court concluded that under a state-created danger theory, the state
could be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the state should not
have terminated foster care." 0 Michael was placed in the custody of his
biological mother, who had known propensities for violent and bizarre
behavior, thereby increasing the foreseeable risk of harm to the child.
In support of their decisions to apply a danger creation theory in the
foster care context, courts distinguish from DeShaney, in which the Court
reasoned, "while the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced.., it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render
him any more vulnerable to them.""' Indeed, this language provides a
loophole which lower courts have utilized in particularly egregious
situations.
E. ASSESSING WHETHER A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION SHOULD BE
PERMITTED.
1. Avenue of Redress When A Child's Rights Have Been Severely
Violated
The quality and quantity of child welfare services offered vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction." 2  There are federal standards which are
supposed to be met by each state, but unfortunately the child welfare
systems in many jurisdictions seem to be in utter disarray. 113 For many
children, foster care is one traumatic episode in a series of difficult life
struggles.' 14 The circumstances which lead to foster care'placement often
include, among other things, severe poverty, drug abusing parents, lack of
housing, domestic violence and violent communities.
The child welfare system is meant to protect children exposed to
numerous risk factors." 5 When the system actually takes steps to place
these children in a more vulnerable position, the children must be afforded
an opportunity to challenge this in a court of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
meant to (and does) provide redress for such unacceptable action by state
107. Id. at *5-6.
108. See id. at *6.
109. See id.
110. See id. at *7.
111. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
112. See GLUCKMEZEY, supra note 5, at 95.
113. Seeid.
114. See Jennifer R. Gavin, Child Welfare Law Curricula in Legal Education:
Massachusetts' Untried Opportunity, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 9, 12 (1998).
115. Seeid.
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actors. The fact that a severe injury occurs after a child has been
carelessly, and in many cases recklessly, returned to a natural parent should
not prevent the case from going forward. A jury should hear the facts of
the case and make the ultimate decision.
2. State Actor Accountability
It is widely accepted that the child welfare system in this country is
failing miserably. '1 6 The impact of this failure is severely effecting the
children. Those who are directly responsible must be held accountable and
should not be permitted to avoid 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability when their
actions place a child in a 'snake pit' solely because the person who inflicted
the abuse was a natural parent.
First of all, holding actors accountable will ultimately improve the
delivery of services to children who suffer from the failures in the system.
Holding these authorities accountable by imposing Constitutional liability
will do much more to improve the foster care system than a mere slap on
the wrist or the occasional sting of bad exposure in the local media.
Social service agencies charged with protecting children from abuse
and neglect may improve delivery of services by hiring only qualified
caseworkers, providing ongoing training and supervision to the workers
and decreasing the caseloads assigned to an individual caseworker.
Caseworkers assigned to cases which involve severe abuse should be
highly qualified to do so.117 It may be acceptable to have less experienced
workers handle cases which are not as severe. However, severe cases
should be handled only by individuals holding a masters degree in
psychology or social work and with a certain level of experience handling
these types of case. Also, workers assigned to severe cases should have a
lighter caseload so that more intense services may be provided to the
families which they serve. Jurisdictions which choose to cut comers in this
area must be held liable for constitutional violations when children are
returned to parents who severely abuse them.
3. Respecting Family Privacy and Preserving Family Integrity
The jurisprudence in the area of family law values the integrity of the
family and highly respects the value of family privacy." 8 The United
116. See generally Gavin, supra note 114; Levesque, supra note 1; O'Laughlin, supra note
3; Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due Process Right to
Safety, 69 N.C. L. REV. 113; Elizabeth A. Sammann, The Reality of Family Preservation
Under Norman v. Johnson, 42 DEPAULL. REV. 675 (1992).
117. Caseloads of child welfare workers have grown beyond the ability of workers to
provide necessary services to families. Workers are overburdened, poorly paid and too
often not trained for the work they are required to perform. See Levesque, supra note 1, at
11.
118. See generally Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy and the Maltreated
Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 569 (1992).
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States Supreme Court has "long recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."" 9 This high value for
family is based on the assumptions that "privacy strengthens families" and
"parents will act in the best interests of their children."' 120 Though cultural
differences may account for different parenting styles, most parents attempt
to act in the best interests of their children. Nonetheless, privacy
interests of families must be compromised to some extent in order to
protect children from parents who act contrary to the best interests of their
children.
4. Continuing to Encourage Reunification
The primary goal of the foster care system is to permit children to
remain with their families if it is possible and, if the child must be
removed, to work with the families as rapidly as possible so that they can
be reunited. 122 Unfortunately, there has been criticism of the system for
removing children too often and allowing them to languish in foster homes
for far too long. 23 If social services workers are fearful of litigation for
abuse imposed after returning foster children to their natural parents, this
already serious problem may be exacerbated. Therefore, courts should
only allow a private right of action under the state-created danger theory in
particularly egregious cases. By doing this, caseworkers will still be able
to do their jobs but will be held accountable when their acts are particularly
egregious.
IV. CONCLUSION
The private right of action alleging substantive due process violations
in the foster care context should be permitted. However, in order to serve
the interests of the children and the social services agencies involved,
limitations must be placed on it. The four-part test set out by the Third
Circuit serves as a solid guide for determining whether a private right of
action should be permitted. An additional safeguard, which should be
imposed, is to limit the cause of action only to discrete parties as opposed
to the public at large.
Allowing the private right of action only when these requirements are
met will provide an avenue of redress for children who unquestionably
deserve it. At the same time, the important task of reuniting families when
possible will not be thwarted because social services workers will not be in
119. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
120. McMullen, supra note 118, at569.
121. See generally Robert Halpern, Poverty and Early Childhood Parenting: Toward a
Framework of Intervention, AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, Jan. 1990, at 6-18.
122. See GLUCKMEZEY, supra note 5, at 97.
123. See id.
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:2
Summer 2000] FOSTER CARE 257
constant fear of frivolous litigation in federal court.

